Editorials
A plea for the plaintiff'
What I have to write may not be altogether acceptable, but I have some justification because it is based on an unusual personal experience in medical negligence actions amounting to over 150 cases. It might be wondered why an anaesthetist should be so involved with medical negligence cases. I am sure we are not more negligent than others, but when an anaesthetic accident occurs the results are usually devastating. This is very evident when considering the words of Mr Justice Bristow (1979) who, when commenting on the results of such a case appearing before him, described the patient's condition as 'a living death'.
The exhaustive report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury (Pearson Commission 1978) gave credence to the view that lawyers acting for a possible plaintiff find great difficulty in finding suitable medical experts who will advise them about the substance of the case and who also are willing to give expert evidence in any subsequent hearing in a court of law. Doctors do not like to be involved in proceedings which seek to prove that gross errors have been made by those who are their colleagues and may even be friends. Furthermore, those errors often could have been made by themselves, which is apparent from the title chosen by the current President of the Medical Defence Union, 'There but for the Grace of God . . .' (Wylie 1975) .
In medical cases the plaintiff has a most difficult task to prove negligence, and it may be illuminating to consider the background reasons for this state of affairs. Negligence is a tort dating back to the last century. It is a civil wrong done to a person by which that person gains the right of action for damages. The difficulty of success in specifically medical claims is evident when one considers that 86% of personal injury cases result in some payment but only 30-40% of medical claims receive any indemnity (Pearson Commission 1978) . Doctors may well be more careful in their professional activities than the average motorist or industrial concern, but doctors are still human beings who must make human mistakes some of which must be negligent. It is more of a human problem when one realizes that these mistakes often result in 'Arising from presentation to the Section of Anaesthetics, 6 January 1984 0 141-0768/84/100813-04/$01 .00/0 injuries far more serious than thos o1 types of non-medical accidents. There haseen a change in this indemnity payment rate because there has been a huge increase in the cost of the medical indemnity insurance which has been a matter of considerable comment in the medical press (e.g. Harland & Jandoo 1984) . Some of this low compensation rate may be due to our skills, but some is also due to the legal impediments that make it very difficult, costly and time-consuming to prove medical negligence. One of these impediments is the finding of a willing expert witness, but there are several others. Legal impediments start early in the investigation of the complaint and arise when the solicitors attempt to obtain the hospital notes relating to the treatment which is the source of the complaint. The legal advisers to the Regional Health Authorities very often refuse to release these notes even to the medical expert who has been instructed by the plaintiff's solicitors. This response, though very common, is ethically questionable because medical records can be inspected by a possible plaintiff or those acting for him, pursuant to sections 33 and 34 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. If it makes an order for disclosure, the court now has discretion to confine inspection to the plaintiffs medical, legal or other professional advisers. On more than one occasion the medical profession and the health authorities unsuccessfully challenged the interpretation of the forerunner of this statutenamely the Administration of Justice Act 1970 which introduced the courts' disclosure powersnotably in Dunning v. United Liverpool Hospitals Board of Governors (1973) , but also in Davidson v. Lloyd Aircraft Services Ltd (1974) , Deistung v. South West Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board (1975), and Mclvor v. Southern Health and Social Services Board (1978) , the later decision having being reversed by the Supreme Court Act (1981) . My own experience has been that the discretion has not been used to limit disclosure solely to medical experts.
Nevertheless, health authorities, who are well aware of the courts' powers to order disclosure of documents, are still coy about releasing medical notes directly to solicitors or medical experts; and although an application to a court may resolve the impasse, time is wasted and the plaintiff has to bear the immediate costs of the application. The defence societies have expressed concern that notes of a sensitive clinical nature should be available to lay people who may misinterpret the (j 1984 The Royal Society of Medicine entries, but this the law clearly discounts. Accepting this concern, there can be no difficulty in releasing the notes directly to the plaintifts medical adviser, but frequently I have found that this has taken many months and sometimes has required a court order. Such an unsympathetic response coupled with legal manoeuvring of this kind reflects badly on the humanity of medicine when one considers that the plaintiff is usually an individual who is often sick in mind and body, legally inexperienced and very worried about the costs of the action.
The courts have tended to require a higher standard of proof in cases of medical negligence than in other types of professional negligence. There is some justification for the view held by some lawyers (Jones 1984 ) that the courts have been unusually supportive of the medical profession and require a very high standard of proof in medical cases, and it is possible that this pro-defendant attitude has arisen to discourage medical negligence actions on the grounds that any other course might encourage defensive medicine.
As an example, in the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning (1979) , in his judgment on the anaesthetic case that I have already quoted, said that 'If the sums [awarded] get too large... we are in danger of injuring the body politic', and again in the failed forceps case (1980): 'Young men are even deterred from entering the profession [in USA] because of the risks involved'. There has never been any evidence that such events were or are likely to happen, but the burden of proof for the plaintiff is still very high. Some of the judiciary are forthright in their defence of the medical profession, as is seen in Maclean's (1981) appraisal of Denning, which uses the emotive wording 'Negligencea Dagger in the Doctor's Back'. If one is aware of what constitutes medical negligence in a legal sense, then this undue support is not so apparent. The standard of care expected of a doctor has not changed since that given as a direction to the jury by Mr Justice McNair in 1957, which was that 'A doctor is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art'. However, confusion may arise from other judgments such as Denning's (1980) in Whitehouse v. Jordan, that 'an error of judgement is not negligent', but this was rightly rejected by the House of Lords as ambiguous because errors of judgment may well be negligent depending on the circumstances in which they are made (Whitehouse v. Jordan 1981).
This classical test has been applied in many important cases, such as the failed forceps case of Whitehouse v. Jordan (1981) and the mediastino-scopy case of Maynard v. West Midlands Regional Health Authority (1983) . What is not generally realized in the medical profession is that this test allows the medical profession, virtually unfettered by the law, to set the standard of professional competence demanded by the law. Thus it is even more unfortunate that members of the profession are so reluctant to give evidence about possible errors. Some of the public response. has been to accuse the profession of a 'cover up', whereas most aggrieved lawyers are content to call our behaviour typical of that of a cabal. Although the Pearson Commission (1978) noted this reluctance of doctors to become involved in criticism of their colleagues, there is no evidence that I am aware of which shows that there is a concerted effort on their part to thwart investigation or legal process, which is in contrast to the conduct of their professional and legal advisers. There is no doubt that the medical profession are frequently criticized for their apparent reluctance to allow lawful enquiry into tragic medical accidents. They are not themselves, however, personally responsible in the great majority of cases. The worst example of this reluctance, in my view, was the refusal of the medical defence organizations to let the medical staff give evidence to the enquiry into the anaesthetic accident that occurred in Hereford in 1981 (Sunday Times 1982 . This was because, inter alia, they were worried that the proceedings of an enquiry might be used in evidence in subsequent court proceedings. I believe that the repetition of,this attitude has contributed greatly to the so-called medicolegal crisis.
The defence societies were set up by doctors for doctors and their patients; they were never meant to shelter the careless doctor behind intricate legal processes, and it is the disregard of this aim coupled with the evidential problem which I believe has, in part, led to this crisis. It is salutary to recall that within three weeks of an anaesthetic death due to an apparatus failure occurring in 1873, a full report of the fault and how it occurred was published in the medical press (Lancet 1873). This contrasts adversely with the frustration of the Hereford enquiry by the defence societies, because two other anaesthetic deaths occurred a few months later from identical apparatus employment faults (Sunday Times 1982) .
Faults there may be on the medical side but there are also faults on the plaintiffs side. There seems to be a common failing amongst solicitors and their clients in this field to equate a medical accident with medical negligence. In my particular field of expertise, Lord Justice Denning (as he was then) said in 1954: 'Every surgical operation involves risk. It would be wrong and, indeed, bad law to say that simply because a misadventure or mishap occurs, the hospital and the doctors are thereby liable'. It is extremely difficult for a court to determine if the plaintiff's injuries were the result of carelessness or the materialization of a known risk and it is here that the plaintiff's expert often has a difficult task, for he must try to decide if the possibility of such an event was real or whether its pronouncement is a clever defence strategy. The burden of proving negligence rests with the plaintiff, and usually no matter how impressive are the plaintiff's experts, if the defence proffers a sound argument against there being negligence then the plaintiff's action will fail. Again the Pearson Commission (1978) gives us some indication that the defence in such cases is usually sound, because in that report of the 25 cases per year which were taken to court the plaintiffs were shown to lose 20. The plaintiffs difficulty is that he has the burden of proof coupled with a high standard of proof. However, in a recent High Court decision by Mr Justice Pain (1983) this burden was effectively reversed and put on the defendants. The circumstances were special. The injury allegedly resulted from a doctor departing from the practices that were actually designed to prevent the very type of injury sustained; thus the doctor had the burden of proving that he was not negligent. To me, this showed that the law is mindful of the difficulties facing the plaintiff.
The difficulty of obtaining expert medical evidence has led some lawyers in the recent past to attempt to use the maxim of res ipsa loquitur (literally, the thing speaks for itself) which is a catchy Latin tag that was first applied by an American judge over 100 years ago when a barrel of flour fell in a warehouse. The justification for its employment is that the facts are obviousfor example, a patient has the wrong limb amputated. Otherwise it is a very dangerous doctrine to rely on in medical cases, which are fought on the adverserial principle and depend so heavily on expert evidence from the plaintiff and the defendants. Its employment must surely be a condemnation of a profession which shrinks from criticism of its own members in the courts.
The record of unsuccessful defence in court hearings by the medical profession and its defence organizations (1 in 5) and the attendant misery for the doctors and patients concerned in such hearings will continue (because often such cases should never be brought) unless the medical profession take a closer interest and sometimes play a non-defensive part in this work. Otherwise it will remain largely the province of apparently dispassionate, indeed passionless, lawyers, and our patients' confidence in the medical profession will be further eroded.
On many occasions when I have appeared for the plaintiff at a court hearing, the attitude displayed by the medical team of the defendants has frequently suggested to me that I am in some way behaving in a reprehensible fashion. The display reached a peak when the judgment of Mr Justice Pain included a rebuke to a senior member of the council of a defence organization who had given expert evidence in a case in which I had appeared for the plaintiff (Ford v. McKay and Trent Regional Hospital Board 1976, unreported) . During his evidence this expert had made a personal attack on me, and the judge considered that this medical witness was responsible for the discourteous manner in which I was cross-examined.
Sometimes, when an opinion is obtained from a medical expert, the report does not explain the reason for the expert's conclusion that negligence was not possible. Some members of the medical profession appear to feel aggrieved that their actions or those of their colleagues should be questioned and respond to enquiry in a robust manner denying any possibility of gross error. It must be remembered that while the lawyers may predict the findings of the court, only the courts can decide the issue of negligence; therefore no doctor can so rule on a case, but some still persist in doing just thatwhich may be why we have gained a reputation for arrogance amongst some lawyers. A medical report should recite and explain the facts on which the opinion reaches its conclusion. This opinion may well be that the doctor did nothing which was outside the normal practice of those in his specialty, but the reasons must be given. Lawyers are well able to understand the niceties of our practice and we do them a great disservice by attempting to make dogmatic statements on the grounds that to do otherwise would be too difficult for their understanding.
It must not be thought that there is universal complacency amongst the leaders of our profession with what is a growing problem. Bolt (1984) has already expressed a view, and it is hoped that others of a similar mind will restore some non-legalistic humanity to the profession. This may prove more expensive; but why should the largest nationalized industry in the worldthe National Health Servicebe privately insured by the doctors for our work in that industry?
John The strong association with the HLA-B5 (Bw5 I split) antigen has been confirmed by further studies from Japan, Turkey and Italy (Adorno et al. 1979 , Ohno et al. 1982 , Sasazuki et al. 1982 , Yazici et al. 1980a ). HLA-B5 has been shown to be present in 62-87% of patients in studies from these countries (controls 23-43%), the high incidence being predominantly associated with an increase of HLA-Bw51 in Japan and Turkey (patients 60-84%; controls 15-23%). The incidence of HLA-B5 and Bw51 was not significantly above that of controls in the United Kingdom (B5 18%; Bw51 12%) (Yazici et al. 1980a ). It has been suggested that the HLA-B5 antigen is particularly related to ocular involvement (Lehner et al. 1979) and it is well recognized that there is a very high incidence of ocular disease in Japanese and Turkish patients where the incidence of B5(Bw5l) is higher in the general population than in the United Kingdom.
Hypersensitivity to an intradermal needle prick (a positive 'pathergy test') has again been advocated as a useful diagnostic test. From Japan it was shown that by performing 10 needle pricks at different sites in the same patient the frequency of positive results could be increased from 52% to 84% of patients. Thus in individual patients tested with multiple needle pricks some sites gave a positive result and some negative (Suzuki & Mizuno 1982) . From Turkey it has been proposed that the combination of a positive pathergy test, found in 82% of patients, and the possession of the HLA-B5 antigen, present in 84% of patients, is a diagnostic marker. Both
